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The Futures of Central and Eastern Europe: 
Three Twentieth-century Perspectives 
On the 19 October 1915, T. G. Masaryk — later the first president of 
Czechoslovakia — gave the inaugural lecture of this School; in his 
audience was the prime minister of the day, Asquith. His theme was ‘The 
Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis’. In the middle of the 
war, Masaryk was engaged in persuading the world that independence for 
the Czechs was a legitimate objective. He began by saying that the war 
was about nations and added that there was much work to be done on this 
topic. Indeed, the problem that he saw was that the emphasis was all on 
the state. The distinction between state and nation is vital, he believed, 
because there existed ‘an incongruity of political and ethnographic 
boundaries’. 
Masaryk noted that there were 28 states and 62 nations or nationalities 
in Europe, meaning that the then existing states were nationally mixed; he 
singled out Austria-Hungary as one where the German minority ruled over 
a polyglot people in Austria and a Hungarian minority did the same in the 
Kingdom of Hungary. He identified Central Europe as a zone where the 
question of nationality and the language question were the central political 
issue and that ‘this zone supplies the most urgent and clamant cause for 
remodelling the political organisation of Europe. In this zone’, he 
continued, ‘the smaller nations are continually striving and fighting for 
independence and liberty’. 
Masaryk took the definition of the nation as self-evident. Any group 
that had its language and was ethnographically the same was a nation; the 
nation was a natural organisation, whereas the state was more artificial. 
Furthermore, where nation and state were out of alignment, the state 
would be "autocratic, ruling and domineering’, even while ‘the nation is 
democratic, administering, social developing from within’. The numerical 
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size of nations was not really significant with respect to their right to 
independence. ‘History shows’, 1 quote again, ‘that national states develop 
in Europe. And History is in favour not only of big, but also of medium¬ 
sized and small national states’. 
You can see, 1 think, where Masaryk’s argument was leading him — 
towards underpinning the case for the Czech nation and he took it for 
granted, by the way, that the Slovaks were a part of this nation. We know 
the outcome. Masaryk was successful in that the nations of Central Europe 
— quite a few of them anyway — did gain their independence, state and 
nation did coincide up to a point, but the problems of the region were not 
solved as a result. 
There is an explanation for this. Masaryk’s definition of the nation, as 
being based on language and ethnography, is nothing like as satisfactory 
as he thought. And he seriously underestimated the role of the modem 
state as the central political organisation of our time and one without 
which freedom and democracy are inconceivable. It seems more than 
likely that Masaryk was not familiar with the work of Max Weber, who 
warned that national affiliation was not based necessarily only on descent, 
on language or religion, but also on other factors, like memories of a 
common political destiny. 
The fate of independent Central and Eastern Europe is the focus of the 
second of my two perspectives linked to this School. In 1944, Hugh Seton- 
Watson, for many years professor of history here and who will be 
remembered by many of us, published his book Eastern Europe between 
two Wars. It is an incisive and cogent work that remains required reading 
to this day. What is less known is that in the first edition of the book, 
Seton-Watson included a final chapter, ‘Eastern Europe and the Great 
Powers’, in which he tried to look forward to the post-war years; this 
chapter was omitted from later editions, because he thought it outdated 
and dealt with a future that was made illusory by events, crucially by the 
imposition of communism. I would like to go back to this chapter, 
however, because it contains a number of perspectives that are highly 
instructive and illuminating about the Central and East European region. 
The chapter obviously bears the marks of the time when it was written. 
Perspectives are distorted by war and just as Masaryk’s belief in the 
liberating power of national independence was confounded by events, so 
was the faith that Seton-Watson placed in communism and the Soviet 
Union, as he rather ruefully acknowledged in subsequent editions of the 
book. 
That said, the chapter offers a number of insights that are impressive in 
their vision. So, Seton-Watson wrote, ‘Germany is the greatest State on 
the European Continent and the only wholly European Power in the world. 
The future of Germany can decide the future of Europe.’ This may seem 
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unremarkable today, but it was nothing like so clear-cut in 1944, when — 
as Seton-Watson says — there were those who demanded ‘that in addition 
to disarmament the whole German economy must be crippled and German 
industry must be destroyed’. The extrapolation of this dystopic fantasy, 
incidentally, is the subject of the Austrian writer Christoph Ransmayr’s 
fascinating recent novel, The Dog King. 
Seton-Watson saw very well that Europe needed Germany and that 
without a successful reintegration of Germany into Europe, the entire 
continent would suffer instability — nowhere more so than in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The restoration of order in these states, however, was a 
formidable task. The economic side, reconstruction, was one problem, but 
without a hard look at the question of political frontiers, there would be no 
stability in the region. He called for even-handed treatment of all the 
nations of the area, regardless of which side they were on in the war, 
above all because the post-1918 settlement, based as it was on the ‘victor- 
versus-vanquished’ system, was deeply flawed. There was an urgent need 
for a new type of settlement, that based on a federation. ‘The importance 
of Federation’, he wrote, ‘is that it seems to provide a line of treatment 
that will at least reduce the emphasis formerly put on questions of national 
minorities, frontiers and Empires’. And this, we might say, is where we 
come to 1998. 
Masaryk and Seton-Watson were writing in the midst of war and, as I 
have been suggesting, war is uniquely constricting intellectually — all 
perspectives are influenced and narrowed by it. Our perspectives today 
are, it goes without saying, very different. The present and future of 
Central and Eastern Europe now, at the end of the 20th century, at the 
Millennium (even if you think that the Millennium begins in 2001), are 
conditioned by very different considerations. 
What has changed since my predecessors surveyed the scene? In brief, 
and I shall look at some of these processes in greater detail presently, I can 
see five great shifts. 
[1] The first of these is growth. There is simply far more of everything. 
Our physical-material world has changed vastly and irrevocably. 
Continuous growth creates problems for institutions, ideas, more potential 
for conflict, new forms of knowledge and power. 
[2] The second is globalisation. I know that ‘globalisation’ is a fashionable 
buzzword; nevertheless, it is also a real phenomenon with real 
implications. 
[3] The third is the end of communism, an epoch-making event, the deeper 
implications of which — for the West as much as the East — we are 
barely beginning to understand. 
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[4] The fourth is the transformation of Europe through European 
integration, which has a wide range of consequences, some intended, some 
not. 
[5] And my fifth and final scene-setting point is that we need new 
cognitive instruments to understand the world in which we are living. This 
has been one of the tasks of the social sciences, one it may not have 
discharged with complete satisfaction maybe. But here too, it is possible to 
offer new' syntheses which might yield new insights and I’ll try to do so. In 
particular, I shall make a plea for joined-up thinking. 
1. The first of my major shifts is growth. As I have suggested, there is 
simply far more of everything and this phenomenon, despite one or two 
very short run slow-downs from time to time, shows no signs of ending. 
We should assume that it will persist. 
Some of the implications of continuous growth have to be teased out, 
however, because they are not automatically evident and our political 
thinking is still influenced by a world in which growth was restricted. The 
most striking such shift is the end of poverty in Europe. Not, let me hasten 
to add, the total end of poverty, but when at least four-fifths of the 
population lives significantly above the poverty line as it does in Europe, 
then the assumption that poverty is a major political factor has to be 
revised. Much of the classical Marxist thinking revolves around poverty 
and worsening immiseration. Liberalism echoes this. It has not happened, 
on the contrary. But bits of the old thinking remain. We continue to be 
fascinated by the one-fifth or less of the population that is genuinely 
impoverished and try to construct strategies for the whole of society on 
this basis. Such strategies are, inevitably, flawed. A political movement 
that talks about redistribution will not resonate very much under these 
conditions. I don’t want to be misunderstood here. There is real poverty, 
even in Europe, but it is the exception and not the rule. 
The problematic of the four-fifths tends to be sidelined, therefore, in 
our concern with the remaining one-fifth, but I would like to reverse these 
priorities, because looking at the developed world through the prism of the 
majority reveals something significant about it. 
In effect, with the great majority of the population enjoying a surplus 
in terms of consumption, having access to cheap sources of energy and 
clean water, shelter and heat, food and clothing means that the project of 
modernity has been completed. In this sense, we truly are in a post-modern 
age. Levels of literacy have improved and — this may be more 
controversial for some — the potential for cognitive growth is likewise 
very real. 
A majority of the population with access to more than the basics for 
physical survival and reproduction will necessarily be concerned with 
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issues of cognition and ideas. The nature and direction of technological 
change accelerates this trend. It is a commonplace that manual labour has 
largely declined (down to maybe a quarter of the workforce) and work has 
become non-manual; yet the romance of manual work lives and is 
somehow seen as ‘real’ work. 
The transformation of our views of the world has not kept pace with 
the decline of the significance of the concrete. We continue to regard the 
material world as somehow more real than the cognitive and semantic 
factors by which they are to be interpreted. The context has become more 
important than the fact and to persist with ignoring the cognitive and 
semantic aspects of the world in which we live itself adds up to a kind of 
impoverishment. 
Note here that Central and Eastern Europe is included in the world 
where poverty has mostly disappeared — modernity has been reached, 
though admittedly the collapse of Russian economy may expose large 
sections of the population to poverty again. This was done by communism, 
it was done with enormous cruelty and unbelievable inefficiency, with all 
sorts of negative consequences for the present, but the pre-modem world 
assessed by Seton-Watson has been replaced by one that has many, though 
not all, of the qualities of modernity. 
2. The second scene-setting shift is globalisation. This phenomenon has 
attracted an enormous literature and I don’t propose to go over it. I would 
like to note some of its features, however, because Central and Eastern 
Europe was insulated from most of globalisation by communism and has 
as a result been forced to adapt rapidly and with inadequate means. By 
globalisation I mean not only the loss of control of money by the state, but 
equally the transformation of information through television, the Internet 
and cheap telephony. The rise and rise of English as a second language 
may make communication easier, but it also contributes to making it more 
superficial. The quantity of available information has expanded vastly, 
though whether we have the means to process it is another matter. Events 
can readily become global — the death of Princess Diana and the private 
life of President Clinton are two obvious examples. Styles have become 
global — in leisure, lifestyles, design, dress codes, entertainment. In all 
these fields, instant responses, snap judgements, superficiality inevitably 
impact on politics and political reactions. Then, there are less self-evident 
aspects of global processes, like the growth of travel and the spread of 
disease. Overall, we seem to have found ourselves in a world in which we 
have more choice and paradoxically far less control over our lives, hence 
political power has become more diffuse and meanings are lost. The loss 
of meanings is always unsettling and communities will seek to recreate 
them however and whenever they can. The outcome may be more 
6 George Schopflin: SSEES Inaugural Lecture 
unpredictability as systems of moral regulation are exposed to the impact 
of external forces which seem to be irresistible and opaque. The 
consequence may be greater instability, which will place a new burden on 
the state and other political structures to recreate the coherence that 
communities need. 
3-A. (a) Let me look now at the far-reaching consequences of the end of 
communism in the context of the West first of all. It seems to me from the 
vantage point of not quite a decade after the disappearance of communism 
that the world we now live in has changed in a whole variety of ways that 
we are only gradually able to identify. A wide range of assumptions that 
were ‘normal and natural’ while communism was the ‘other’ by which we 
defined ourselves has now vanished and we are in the process of finding 
new ones. Every society, every culture creates these assumptions, which 
are debated, discussed, contested and then gradually become the norm. 
Before 1989, the way in which the West defined itself was — or so it 
seems to today — fairly straightforward. The West defined itself as the 
‘free world’ and contrasted itself with ‘unfree’ communism, though there 
were also currents of opinion that regarded such comparisons as too 
ideological. In reality, even these currents, sympathetic towards 
communism or at least neutral, continued to accept the basic assumptions 
of the West as normal. 
Then, in 1989, all these definitions began to be questioned. It gradually 
dawned on people that it was no longer possible to persist with these self¬ 
definitions, because the criterion of that definition — communism — had 
disappeared. The significance of this change is still with us. The West is 
still engaged in redefining itself and, without the easy criterion of 
communism, this is proving far more difficult than expected. In a sense, 
the end of communism has put paid to a whole range of accumulated 
experience in the West and the acquisition of new experience, appropriate 
to the new situation, is as always, troublesome and contradictory. 
We can look back to 1989 and see it as a brief moment of euphoria — 
hooray, communism is dead, the epic struggle is over, we’ve won — then 
to be followed by the realisation that things are much more difficult than 
ever. Reality set in. The world, it dawned, was far more complex than it 
had seemed and we have to find ways of dealing with that complexity. 
Indeed, the very contest between West and East, between democracy and 
communism, had hidden that complexity by making our self-definitions 
easier. In this sense, in 1998, we are indeed in a post-war situation, coping 
with the problems of peace, which are nothing like as easy as some might 
have expected. In these circumstances, it is forgivable if some people — 
and I’m not one of them — secretly long for the simple days of that far- 
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away time before 1989. The past is not only a foreign country, but also a 
simpler place to live in. 
(b) One of the problems that were masked by the East-West conflict 
was the role of culture, cultural identities and the political implications of 
cultural identities. Let me explain. If we see the East-West contest as one 
organised around the positive pole of Liberalism and the negative pole of 
Marxism, then it follows that as a result of this contest, Liberalism and 
Marxism came to share certain underlying assumptions about what the 
contest was about. Opponents generally come to resemble one another in 
some ways, otherwise there is nothing to fight about. 
Both Liberalism and Marxism are legatees of Enlightenment 
rationality, hence at least a part of the contest was about which of them 
was the superior legatee. Both place primary emphasis on the role of 
economic identities as the central source of interests — we tend dismiss as 
‘irrational’ behaviour that does not conform to this assumption. The 
consequence of this assumption is that it persistently undervalued and 
underestimated the impact of cultural identities, ethnicity being the most 
prominent of these. The direct outcome of the collapse of communism, 
therefore, is that the saliency of economic identities has receded and 
cultural identities have come into foreground, the political foreground 
included. The problem that we have with this is that the long dominance of 
the Marxist-Liberal contest has left our skills for dealing with cultural 
identities rather rusty. We are in the process currently of reclaiming those 
skills and refurbishing them. 
(c) Furthermore, the 45 year Cold War operated as a kind of cognitive 
closure in the West against extending diversity and against political power 
being attached to different forms of diversity. In a general sense, the 
evolution of democracy — access to power, ways of dealing with power, 
continuously redistributing power — tended to slow down. Pressures from 
below for more power could always be fended off by reference to the 
threat of communism. That threat has gone, of course, so that Western 
democracy is being redefined perforce. We are accumulating new cultural 
capital, but that has never been an easy pastime. 
(d) It follows that the end of communism also places a question-mark 
over European integration, given that no political process has been left 
unaffected. Europe can now be reunited and the concept of ‘West’ has to 
be reformulated. The West is now tied to Central and Eastern Europe and 
its identity is being changed by that engagement. 
It is against this background that we have to assess the eastward 
enlargement of the European Union. 1 shall say something presently about 
enlargement from the perspective of Central and Eastern Europe, but when 
viewed from the Western perspective — well, ok, in some ways a British 
perspective — I rather suspect that the integration of the 10 states that are 
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on the list will pose problems, difficulties and pitfalls that we have not 
even begun to recognise. I have a shrewd suspicion that this will be the 
most difficult enlargement yet. But that is not a reason, it goes without 
saying, for not attempting it. Crucially, the post-communist states come 
with a package of aspirations and assumptions, with forms of knowledge 
and cultural capital, that are in many ways at variance with what the West 
has attained over the last five decades. If nothing else, the negotiations 
will be difficult and the West will have to exercise patience. I say this, 
because, for my part, I have already encountered moments of prejudice, 
irritation, impatience among some, who see the demands of the Central 
and East Europeans as tiresome and excessive. 
3-B. Let me move on now and look at how the collapse of communism has 
changed the East. 
(a) The first point is one that I stress strongly, because, I would like to 
suggest, it contains the answer to many of the puzzles of the post¬ 
communist transformation. It is about the nature of the post-communist 
state. 
We think of 1989 as the collapse of communism, the decay and 
disappearance of an ideology. This is right, but it does not go far enough. 
It was not just communism as an ideology that collapsed, but so too did 
the communist state. The post-communist states, therefore, are engaged in 
a quite extraordinary enterprise — that of rebuilding a discredited state, 
regaining prestige for the state as a central instrument of creating 
coherence. One of the most complex and most urgent roles that the state 
anywhere has to play is to establish a degree of coherence. Every society, 
every political community, every human collectivity is involved in the 
creation of coherence, what Mircea Eliade called 'making cosmos out of 
chaos’. In politics, the state has the central role in creating and maintaining 
coherence. 
This poses particular difficulties for the post-communist state, which is 
charged with a wide range of tasks that would tax even the best ordered, 
best run Western state. Indeed, one of these is the supervision of its own 
partial dismantling, the redistribution of the assets that the communist state 
owned to private owners. The criteria for redistribution, which includes 
certain moral criteria, are not agreed — should property go to those who 
are best capable of managing it or equally to all? How far should the state 
continue to support collective consumption and thus encourage vertical 
dependency? When should the state subsidise economic activity, knowing 
that a withdrawal of the subsidy could mean unemployment? There are no 
easy answers. 
Then, the post-communist state must somehow arrive at a redefinition 
of the just society and do so in the aftermath of a system that discredited 
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the notion of equality without providing alternative models of individual 
and collective endeavour. Crucially, a society that lacks a more or less 
universally accepted set of criteria for success and failure will be deeply 
divided and the state order that it runs will be inconsistent and thus find it 
difficult to reestablish its status. Citizens will not have much of a sense of 
the public good, but will prefer to regard the state as an exploitable 
resource. I hardly need add that this produces the wrong kind of cultural 
capital. 
It is this central weakness of the post-communist state that accounts for 
the phenomena so often noted at both the journalistic and academic level, 
like the propensity of conflict to polarise immediately, corruption, lack of 
trust. There are few internalised models of seeing conflict resolution as 
anything other than a zero-sum game and the state is too impotent to 
impose its own will to achieve positive-sum games. Similarly, the state is 
too weak to pursue good governance — transparency, accountability, 
predictability in the exercise of power. And as long as power is opaque, 
the population will live with fear and fear is no basis for democracy. 
Further, the weak post-communist state cannot readily advance the 
semantic empowerment of the population. Marxism-Leninism was a 
deeply reductionist system, in which by the end of its days, there was no 
meaningful language of public discourse. The disappearance of Marxism- 
Leninism left a void, a void in how to communicate in the public sphere, 
how to express ideas, articulate interests, make demands and so on, in 
ways that would command consent. The only public language that could 
perform this task was that of nationhood and, given that communism had 
eradicated the patterns of civil society and citizenship, nationhood 
inevitably acquired an ethnicised colouring. But ethnicity does little or 
nothing to generate civic understanding, to advance codes of 
communication that reflect social aspirations on the basis of citizenship 
and, crucially, because ethnicity has nothing to say about the consistent 
and predictable exercise of power, it tends to strengthen rather than 
diminish fear. Only with the semantic reempowerment of the population 
will it be possible to marginalise those who play upon this fear, the 
populists and ethnic entrepreneurs who disfigure the political scene in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Anyone who spends time in the region will 
know how frequently public figures are charged with manipulation. These 
charges will only vanish when semantic empowerment has gained in 
strength. 
Then, the weakness of the state is exacerbated by a challenge from an 
rather unexpected quarter — civil society. The West has evolved a 
remarkably powerful discourse of civil society against the high capacity 
state of the West and this Western set of ideas encountered the 
assumptions and arguments of the democratic opposition from the 
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communist period, which had created its own parallel discourse. The two 
are alike and have influenced one another. What is shared between them is 
their rejection of the state. For the West, this rejection derives partly from 
libertarian ideas that believe that the very existence of the state is an 
infringement of individual liberty and equally from Marxist arguments that 
the state is no more than the articulation of the interests of ruling 
capitalism. 
The views of the democratic opposition were formulated against the 
all-encompassing totalising ideology of the communist system and were 
known by the name ‘anti-politics’. The positive side of this anti-state, anti- 
etatist discourse is the active role that civil society has in the building and 
running of democracy, and in creating the space for individual initiative 
and creativity. What both Western and Central and East European 
arguments are inclined to overlook is that the discourse of civil society 
now has different context after 1989. Under post-communism, the state 
ought to be regarded as a positive or neutral actor and civil society cannot 
function very effectively without it. Civil society is intimately linked to 
citizenship and citizenship is closely dependent on state regulation. The 
legacy of the past is no longer appropriate to a changed present and in 
some ways is harmful. There are well-attested cases of groups legitimating 
their rather uncivil initiatives by reference to acting in the name of civil 
society. The privatisation of coercion, as in Russia, is the extreme case; the 
Russian state barely exists. 
(b) I have referred here more than once to communism having created 
the wrong kind of cultural capital. 1 was asked recently at a conference 
near Prague about what is the right kind of cultural capital and how one 
goes about creating it. Briefly, the right kind of cultural capital in the 
political realm is one where there are accepted second order rules, 
informal as much as formal, that political actors can follow without risk of 
suffering loss of power. Thus if there is a tacit convention that a new 
government will not undo everything that its predecessor did and it will 
not move to indict politicians from the previous regime, one can say that 
there is some second order regulation to safeguard the system and then 
those in power will have an incentive to treat their opponents as something 
other than sworn enemies. 
Another illustration is where political actors accept that conflict will be 
resolved through adjudication, that procedures will be followed invariably 
and that decisions will be enforced with consistency; equally, decisions 
can be appealed. Or, that all political actors have visible and equal access 
to power, that all will rely on the same rules and not use the rules to gain 
undue advantage. Self-limitation is crucial — actors can then have 
confidence that others will exercise power by the same rules. The state 
should as far as possible be neutral as between different political forces. 
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How one goes about creating the right kind of cultural capital is much 
more of a problem, because the questionable practices of post-communism 
have become entrenched and are perfectly rational within their context. 
External support for the neutrality of the state is one way forward, but this 
is unpopular both in the states concerned and the likely external 
supporters. 
(c) The collapse of communism had another dimension with 
consequences for the present — it was the collapse of a moral order, a 
negative moral order, to be sure, but one that was authentic in that people 
defined their aspirations, life strategies, codes of morality against it. The 
collapse has, therefore, left many people adrift, without the devil they 
knew and they are finding it difficult to identify with a positive moral 
order or are deeply divided about the kind of moral order that should exist. 
There are more practical issues that derive from this aspect of the collapse. 
What are the attainments reached under communism now worth? How 
should one deal with the obligations and loyalties that were formed then? 
Are any of the codes of solidarity still valid? There are no ready answers 
to these dilemmas and there cannot be until a new, generally agreed set of 
moral values has established roots. And as long as the quest for a moral 
order continues, much of the political discourse will be moralising and 
moralised, and, it can be taken for granted, these are much more difficult 
to compromise — pragmatism has no role to play in such circumstances. 
(d) Another baneful legacy of communism is that it has created a 
confusion between ideology and democracy. Each collective interest group 
takes the view that democracy is ideologically determined, that democracy 
is the ideology and that the content and direction of this ideology is 
established by the group in question. There is not much conception of 
ideological pluralism, that in a democracy different ideologies can coexist, 
that their goals can be harmonised and a compromise can be achieved. The 
legacy can be observed most strikingly in the behaviour of political 
parties. At first sight, post-communism has successfully taken over the 
institutions and practices of multi-party pluralism and, if nothing else, 
electoral behaviour seems to confirm this. However, a closer look at the 
political contest at the inter-party level shows something else. Political 
parties treat one another as ideological enemies and not fellow players on 
the political stage. Cross-party compromise is very difficult, if not 
impossible to attain and coalition-building is made more complex because 
deals are seen as betrayal. Each political party treats the world as hostile 
and trusts only its own members. This can be observed in the behaviour of 
the communist successor parties, for example, which at the end of the day 
will always look after the survivors of the old nomenklatura. 
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4. (a) My next broad theme is the problem of European integration a 
decade after the end of communism. There are very basic questions at 
issue, the central one being, what is European integration for today? The 
Jean Monnet paradigm has been one of the greatest successes of modem 
politics. It definitively ended the 1914-1945 Great European Civil War 
and it also accepted that the very hard differentiation between states that 
existed before 1939, the strict interpretation of state sovereignty, must be 
diluted. Seton-Watson’s analysis was spot on in this respect, as it was on 
the question of the absolute necessity of bringing Germany back into the 
comity of states. 
That said, the Jean Monnet paradigm was, in part, predicated on the 
existence of a communist threat and the disappearance of that threat has 
forced Europe to rethink its intellectual assumptions about how and with 
what aim integration should proceed. There are those, of course, who say 
that there has been quite enough integration already, thank you, but that — 
I would suggest — misreads the dynamic nature and quality of Europe. 
Politics cannot be told to stay in the same place. There will be change, not 
least because of globalisation and technological advances, and Europe has 
to be prepared for these changes. The current argument is over what the 
most appropriate forms of preparation might be. what the shape and 
content of the new paradigm should be. 
(b) What makes the European Union different from any other 
international organisation is that the Commission has wide powers of 
regulation without further reference to the member states. This body of 
regulation is the acquis communautaire. The acquis is already very 
extensive, at least 40,000 pages (in the most concise language, Swedish) 
and is growing. A rough and ready calculation suggests that Brussels 
currently controls something like 15 percent of what had been traditionally 
regulated by the state; and this percentage is increasing, meaning that 
Brussels is steadily acquiring more power. 
I don’t regard regulation by the European Union as in any way 
inherently undesirable, but whatever the case, power demands legitimation 
and the extension of power demands a corresponding expansion of 
legitimation. At the centre of democratic government is the proposition 
that the most effective form of rule is rule by consent and the more power 
that an institution acquires, the greater is the input of consent that it needs. 
From this perspective, the European Union still shows its origins in its 
technocratic and functionalist assumptions. The proposition that 
effectiveness confers legitimacy is not working well and one does not have 
to be a Eurosceptic to say so. Specifically, as the EU claims to exercise 
growing power over areas traditionally reserved to the state, it will require 
the kind of consent that the state has created for itself. This must include 
not only institutional means, like a parliament with greater powers, but 
The Futures of Central and Eastern Europe 13 
also a stronger symbolic and mythic legitimation than at present. This 
suggestion flies in the face of the EU’s founding assumptions, as well as 
the power of the member states, which are prepared to see an expansion of 
the acquis precisely because consent to it is partial and can be disavowed. 
(c) The demand for greater access to power will, then, necessarily 
affect the nature of Europe. By the criterion of democracy, this evolution 
is positive, because it means that the European Union — the European 
project — would be acquiring a political reality, a reality in terms of 
political power, in the context of which technocratic solutions are no 
longer satisfactory. In other words, European integration is beginning to 
be the object of mass politics, not merely elite politics. 
(d) This shift — if and when it happens — will have its consequences. 
The particular kind of order, the kind of coherence that the European 
Union has established hitherto has been heavily marked by its origins — 
insistence on the acquis in its existing form is a good indicator, as is the 
particular methods used to resolve conflict (usually without much popular 
input). Underlying the EU method is the assumption that underlies a part 
of the legitimacy of the modern state — that it is the repository of ultimate 
rationality. 
However, if the EU is to enhance its legitimacy — and I have been 
arguing that without such enhancement further integration will run into 
mounting opposition — it will have to take on board the very different 
ways of doing things that have been developed throughout Europe and 
become genuinely open to the diversity that Europe is, that Europe 
reflects. Diversity is the essence of Europe — the readiness to apply 
different solutions that differ in time and place. This is bound to give rise 
to greater incoherence. But if the European project turns into an attempt to 
establish ever greater homogeneity or creates the impression that it is 
about establishing greater homogeneity, then it will run into the sand. It 
will generate far greater opposition than it has encountered so far. 
(e) This brings me to eastward enlargement. This process has begun. It 
is impossible to visit the early accession states and not be made aware of 
the increasing impact of the EU, both through direct presence, by means of 
various inputs of human and monetary capital and similarly indirectly, 
through the conditionalities of accession and the expectations that have 
been created. 
Nevertheless, I believe that eastward enlargement is the most difficult 
enlargement that the EU has ever attempted. Some of reasons are set out in 
what I have been arguing about the nature of post-communism. But others 
are to do with the particular cognitive baggage that post-communist 
societies and elites bring with them. Broadly speaking, they are not 
primarily seeking to join Europe-as-EU but Europe as ‘Europe’, as a 
symbolic reintegration into a cultural universe from which they feel they 
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were unjustly and illegitimately excluded by communism and which they 
need to sustain their moral and cultural self-esteem. In this sense, the 
Central and East Europeans are looking to Europe to play an analogue of 
the role that it played with respect to France and Germany in the early 
1950s. Europe is there to resolve their status as communities of value. The 
other arguments, to do with security and prosperity are, I would like to 
suggest, downstream of the quest for status and worth. 1 am not persuaded 
that enlargement is invariably viewed in these terms in Brussels or in the 
capitals of the member states. 
There are further difficulties. It is very questionable if even the early 
accession countries can absorb and implement the acquis; and note here 
that the acquis does not stand still. If accession takes place in, say, 2003 
(as the optimists say), then it will no longer be 40,000 pages (in the most 
concise language) but what? 50,000? 
Once inside the EU, the post-communist states and societies will face 
an entirely new set of challenges, many of them positive by the criterion of 
democracy. Diversity will grow and choice will expand with it; so will 
conflict and the procedures for resolving conflict. There will be new 
hierarchies of power, new forms of knowledge and new cultural capital. 
Clearly, the older generation will find this much harder to assimilate than 
those who had less exposure to communism. 
There is in further problem that I would like to mention in the context 
of eastward enlargement. For the post-communists, the European Union 
will be expected to perform some of the functions that their own state 
machinery is too weak to carry out, for the reasons that I sketched earlier. 
This is usually argued in terms of strengthening democracy by way of 
integration into Western structures. In this sense, the EU will have to act 
as a surrogate state. Surrogates are both welcome and unwelcome and the 
EU will have accept this role as a part of the enlargement process. 
Finally in this connection, integration is a two-way process or, to be 
precise, series of processes. Integration involves quite high levels of 
intervention in the affairs of member states by other member states, 
making EU members no longer quite as foreign as before. The Central 
Europeans are some way from recognising that entry into Europe means 
integration with one another. Shock, horror. The communist legacy here is 
one of far-reaching isolation and this shift will be particularly hard, 
because of the tendency to see the other Central European states as 
competitors in a zero-sum game rather than as partners. Indeed, the very 
idea of partnership is more than somewhat alien to these states, whether 
this degree of involvement is with states they do not know at all or with 
states that they know all too well. Integration, then, will give rise to a host 
of new problems. Yet, the federation that Seton-Watson spoke of is very 
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much on the threshold; and, at the same time, all this is a very long way 
from Masaryk’s eulogy for small nations. 
In Western Europe, despite the pleas of the Eurosceptics, the nation¬ 
state as traditionally understood is no longer as sovereign as it was and the 
internal affairs of one member state are increasingly the internal affairs of 
all the others (the British press might find this proposition rather 
daunting). This idea of growing involvement with other member states 
will be difficult for the post-communists to absorb. 'Just as we have 
regained our sovereignty’, a Hungarian friend remarked recently, ‘we find 
that it is useless’. 
5. My final point is a plea for joined-up thinking. I think it clear enough 
that the thrust of my argument has been about the mounting complexity of 
the world that we now inhabit and for the correspondingly growing need 
for the intellectual instruments to cope with this new world, brave or 
otherwise. We can, of course, carry on with trying to understand it by 
going on as we have always done — gathering facts, putting them in some 
kind of order and hoping that some kind of rationality will emerge. But 
I’m not persuaded that this will do much to help us acquire a better grasp 
of the manifold processes that surround us. We do need new ways of 
thinking and conceptual thought provides better answers than the 
piecemeal responses that were appropriate to a materially dominated era. 
Here are some pointers towards joined-up thinking. First, we should 
start from the assumption that the world is more diverse, more complex 
and more abstract than we think. Hence analysis should be suspicious of 
the simple solution, however elegant and however tempting. There really 
are patterns of interconnectedness in the world and our assessment of it is 
more likely to be accurate if the big picture is there. 
The obvious answer isn’t always the correct answer. It happens 
regularly that one gets closer to a satisfactory analysis of a problem by 
probing it in depth. Common sense is not necessarily a virtue and the best 
is not invariably the enemy of the good. Indeed, reductionism can be 
wholly distorting. 
Then, we need ways of coping with the unintended consequences of 
our actions. This demands better insights into both individual and 
collective motivations, crucially including impulses of which we are not 
conscious, but which influence our reactions. Communities are like 
individuals in this respect, in that there are implicit values that govern 
collective action. We should accept that these exist and not seek to reduce 
motivation to one single factor. 
One way of offsetting reductionism is to recognise that if social 
processes are to be energising and thus meaningful, they have to have both 
a positive and a negative pole. Thus ideas can move within a field of 
16 George Schopflin: SSEES Inaugural Lecture 
proposition and counter-proposition. When one of the poles is eliminated, 
the field erodes and the argument will decline in significance. In this 
sense, complete agreement makes an argument inert and unproductive. 
The importance of this method is that it allows us to avoid reductionism 
and predetermined judgements. It also means that winning an argument 
might amount to losing it, should the losing party disengage and leave us 
intellectually isolated. 
The concrete, material world is less important than it was and we 
should look at the cognitive, symbolic, intellectual contexts of the facts, 
the data, the statistics on which we rely. We cannot do without such data, 
but we should begin from the presumption that data on their own tell us 
very little. If we don’t follow this line of analysis we are unlikely to suffer 
humiliation and failure, but our reasoning will be more circumscribed and 
thus less effective. 
An afterthought: the English language is not altogether helpful in this 
respect, in that it does not really like abstraction. It prefers a thoroughly 
concrete, palpable world. An illustration. I spent some of the summer 
reading Peter Nadas’s novel A Book of Memories, looking at both the 
Hungarian original and the English translation. The English version (by 
Ivan Sanders) is excellent, as faithful to the Hungarian as it can be, but it 
cannot avoid making Nadas’s veiled, allusive, tangential language more 
concrete and less ambiguous than it should be. We have to live with this. 
If we really are living in a post-material age then we need post-material 
thinking. This is what I believe joined-up thinking to be. It affects all of 
us; and it will not get any easier. 


